Cold war, hot nukes: legacy of an era. by Clay, R
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t was a dramatic day in the history of radioactive contamination in the
former Soviet Union. On 15 December 2000, a Ukrainian engineer
flipped a switch at Chornobyl (formerly Chernobyl), and the infamous
nuclear power plant—or rather, what was left after the 1986 explosion that
sent eight tons of airborne radioactive particles across the region and into
nearby countries—was finally shut down. After long resisting the closure
because of the need for the energy produced by the plant’s remaining reac-
tor, Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma proclaimed that “the world will
[now] become a safer place” and “people will live in peace.”
In Ukraine alone, millions of people have been affected by the accident
at Chornobyl. Thirty-two people, mostly firefighters, were killed almost
immediately, and at least 4,000 cleanup workers have since died from radia-
tion-induced ailments including cancer. Three million children are still
seeking treatment for Chornobyl-related ailments, according to a 15
December 2000 Associated Press article. People who live near the plant in
northern Ukraine and across the border in Belarus have seen a significant
increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer, especially in children born later
to exposed parents. The widespread fallout also temporarily devastated east-
ern and northern Europe’s agricultural sector. Soviet authorities did not
reveal the Chornobyl accident until Swedish scientists detected airborne
radioactive particles in Sweden and determined that Ukraine was the
source. 
The question of how to clean up radioactive dust and nuclear fuel inside
Chornobyl’s damaged reactor has yet to be answered. And Chornobyl is
just one of the many nuclear-related hazards that continue to threaten the
environmental health of the former Soviet states and their neighbors.
Many factors contribute to this ongoing risk, including policies that
emphasize production over safety, aging facilities, poor maintenance, out-
dated technology, and a lack of skilled operators or the money to pay
them. Much of the former Soviet Union is struggling to cope with a 
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A lesson in reality. The legacy of the 1986 explosion at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant lives on in millions of
affected lives and deserted towns such as nearby Prypyat (left and center, Chornobyl then and today; right, Prypyat).
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Lnuclear power and weapons legacy widely
viewed as the product of government poli-
cies that disregarded human and environ-
mental health for decades.
“Throughout the history of the Soviet
Union we experimented with nuclear power
and bombs quite a bit,” says Vladimir
Slivyak, cochairman of Ecodefense, an envi-
ronmental organization located in
Kaliningrad, Russia. “Moreover, the state
system was not economically oriented,
which made the nuclear and defense
industries feel a lack of responsibility.
Neither industry cared about human
health or the environment; they didn’t
have to pay for the damage. And because it
was one of the largest countries in the
world, it also has the largest contamination
in the world.” Slivyak says the situation
has actually worsened since 1991, because
most of the dangerous facilities are still in
operation, releasing radioactive substances
into the environment in larger amounts
than ever before. “The reason for this is
simple,” he says. “The facilities are old and
in bad technical condition.”
Russia is generally ranked as the most
radioactively contaminated country in the
world, from the Barents Sea on its north-
west border to the Pacific Ocean far to the
east. Its former republics are also contami-
nated but to a lesser degree. To the south,
Kazakhstan has just closed down a former
Soviet weapons testing site, and
Kyrgyzstan is trying to rid itself of radioac-
tive waste from an old Soviet uranium pro-
cessing plant. Lithuania is still running
two Chornobyl-style nuclear reactors,
while Georgian authorities recently
revealed that many soldiers there have
been contaminated by nuclear waste left by
departing Russians at the country’s mili-
tary bases. 
In addition to concerns about radioac-
tive waste, many Western observers are
alarmed over the persistent threat of
nuclear bomb–making materials being
smuggled outof the country. “The prob-
lem of ‘loose nukes’ is still going on,” says
Matthew Bunn, assistant director of the
program in science, technology, and public
policy at the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at Harvard University
in Cambridge, Massachusetts. “In the old
Soviet days,” he says, “they didn’t have to
worry about anyone stealing bomb-making
materials because in a police state, where
every meeting with a foreigner was closely
watched, who would they be sold to?”
Back then, says Bunn, the main threat was
keeping Western spies out rather than
keeping the materials in. Bunn also says
that nuclear workers used to be paid
well—now they’re extremely underpaid
and worrying about how to provide for
their families. 
On the other hand, he adds, security
at the plants has improved over the past
few years as the economy has improved,
and Russian president Vladimir Putin has
tightened state controls. In addition, hun-
dreds of missiles have been taken apart,
tons of enriched uranium have been
destroyed, and thousands of scientists
who had become frustrated to the point
of desperation with decrepit facilities and
lack of work have been placed in useful
positions, lowering the risk of their
involvement in selling secrets. “But,” says
Bunn, “we’re still a long way from an
ideal level of security.”
Russia at the Nucleus
As the hub of communist rule, Russia
acted with general impunity throughout
the Soviet Union. Decisions about build-
ing nuclear power plants and weapons
complexes and disposing of their waste
were made and carried out in secret. Some
of the most covert activities took place at
the Mayak Chemical Combine in the
southern Ural Mountains. Mayak was one
of the closed “plutonium cities” that were
known by the names of nearby towns and
a post office box number, such as Tomsk-7
(since renamed Seversk), Krasnoyarsk-26
(now Zheleznogorsk), and in the case of
Mayak, Chelyabinsk-40 (now Ozersk).
These names have become synonymous
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Dead cities. Closed “nuclear cities” such
as Krasnoyarsk-26 (left, in an underground
facility; above, from outside) are home to
some of the worst nuclear contamination
in Russia. For decades, nuclear waste from
Mayak was dumped directly in the Techa
River (far right), a primary water source for
many villages downstream. Most of these
villages were evacuated, but 4,000 people
remain today in Muslyumovo (near right).
L
e
f
t
 
t
o
 
r
i
g
h
t
:
 
T
h
o
m
a
s
 
N
i
l
s
e
n
;
 
P
N
N
Lwith the worst radioactive contamination
in Russia.
“Starting in the late 1940s, the Russians
released a great deal of radioactive waste
into the waterways near Mayak, including
lakes, streams, ponds, and reservoirs,” says
Don Bradley, technical group manager of
the National Security Division of Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)
in Richland, Washington, and author of
Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive
Waste Management in the Former Soviet
Union. “At Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26,
significant quantities of radioactive waste
were also injected into the ground. For
many years, radioactive effluent at Mayak
was released directly into the Techa River,
a major source of water for 24 villages
along its banks.” All of those villages but
one were eventually evacuated.
Much of the air, water, and soil around
the Mayak complex contains radioactive iso-
topes from the plutonium reprocessing that
still goes on there. In nuclear reactors, plu-
tonium is produced from uranium via neu-
tron-capture reactions and is used to make
nuclear weapons. Plutonium can collect in
bones and interfere with the production of
white blood cells to cause fatal disease. In
addition to building nuclear bombs, Mayak
also reprocesses spent nuclear fuel, a practice
banned in the United States during the
Carter administration primarily because of
concerns over the use of reprocessed fuel to
make additional bombs (“proliferation”)
and the creation of additional radioactive
waste streams. Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, many Russian and Western
scientists have worked together to docu-
ment the extent of the contamination at
Mayak. 
“Contamination there is perhaps the
highest in the world, and the most acute
problem in that region is at Lake Karachay,”
says Thomas Nilsen, a researcher at the
Bellona Foundation, an environmental
organization headquartered in Oslo,
Norway, that is concerned largely with
energy production and nuclear power.
“The Soviets started dumping waste from
reprocessed plutonium into Karachay in
the early 1950s, and extreme levels of radi-
ation are still being monitored there.”
At one time, the most contaminated
side of the small bog-like lake—just a few
hundred meters across—was so “hot” that
a 30-minute exposure would be fatal for
50% of humans, according to Bradley,
who visited the lake’s “cool” side with a
group of researchers in the 1990s. “We
drove out onto the lake with a guy hold-
ing a Geiger counter and a watch,” he
says. “After 90 seconds, we came back. In
that brief time, we received the equivalent
dose of radiation of an airplane flight
from Moscow to New York.” The lake
contains at least 120 million curies of
radioactive waste.
Strontium-90 is readily taken up in the
tissues of plants and animals and can enter
the human food supply, mainly via milk. It
is particularly dangerous for growing chil-
dren as it is easily deposited in the bones
and is believed to induce bone cancer and
leukemia. Cesium-137 also accumulates in
tissues as it moves up the food chain, and
human exposure may result in detrimental
health effects or genetic mutations that can
lead to cancers, according to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. 
Depending on the level of snowfall
each winter, Lake Karachay could poten-
tially dry up in the spring and summer,
and radioactive waste could be carried on
the wind throughout the Chelyabinsk
province, or oblast. Because of its proximi-
ty to Mayak, the area near the lake is unin-
habited. But in 1967 the lake did dry up,
and radioactive dust was blown over an
area of 1,800 square kilometers, contami-
nating at least half a million people,
according to Nilsen. Little is known, how-
ever, about subsequent health effects.
To help prevent such lethal airborne
contamination, Russian engineers have
been gradually covering Lake Karachay
with stones and concrete blocks, a contro-
versial remediation method. “The stones
help prevent the dust, but the weight also
Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 109 | NUMBER 4 | April 2001 A 165
T
h
o
m
a
s
 
N
i
l
s
e
n
Focus •  Cold War, Hot Nukespresses the sediments down and moves
them closer to the groundwater,” says
Nilsen. “It’s a catch-22.”
Lake Karachay is typical of the chal-
lenges the Russians have faced in their
attempts to solve their nuclear waste
problems. At Tomsk-7, they began inject-
ing liquid radioactive waste into the
ground in 1967. To date, tens of millions
of cubic meters of waste have been inject-
ed into deep holes, according to Michael
Foley, a staff scientist at PNNL. Foley
says that Russian scientists carefully chose
an injection zone to be sure the waste
would be isolated from aquifers by subter-
ranean layers of rock. One billion curies
of strontium-90 and cesium-137 have
been injected so far, which, because of
their half-life, would be expected to
shrink to one curie in about 900 years.
However, according to Nilsen, there are
many isotopes present including some
long-lived transuraniums, which means,
he says, that “after 900 years there will be
much more than one curie left.”
Foley and other PNNL scientists have
teamed up with Russian scientists in a
joint U.S. Department of Energy–Russian
Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom)
program to evaluate the environmental
safety of the injection program. “The peo-
ple we work with [in Russia] are environ-
mental patriots,” says Foley. “The mistakes
that were made during the Cold War are
breaking their hearts. At the same time,
though, they’re more pragmatic than in
the West—antinuclear hysteria hasn’t
taken the same hold. They have an awful
lot of cleanup to do, and as far as we can
see they are dealing with it as well as they
can. What they can afford to do, they are
certainly doing.”
An Ocean of Waste
The Kola Peninsula, between the Barents
and White Seas in northwest Russia, is
another major site of actual and potential
nuclear contamination. Hundreds of
nuclear submarines, Russia’s Northern
Fleet, are kept at naval bases along the
coast of the peninsula. More than 32,000
spent naval fuel elements are stored on the
peninsula in dilapidated buildings and
storage facilities or aboard storage vessels,
according to Nilsen. Another 32,000 fuel
elements have yet to be removed from
inactive submarines. 
The explosion and sinking of the
Kursk near the peninsula in August 2000
raised concerns about future radioactive
contamination from that and other sub-
marines’ nuclear reactors. “So far there
haven’t been any leaks, and we don’t
expect there will be any large ones,” Nilsen
says of the damaged Kursk. “But corrosion
of the hull could someday bring the cold
salt water and warm uranium elements
into contact with each other and cause
considerable contamination. That’s why
it’s so important to lift the submarine out
of the water and take it on shore as soon as
possible. The risk is there, and that’s not a
good feeling to have, especially since the
Kursk is also in the most important fishing
grounds of the Barents Sea.”
Far to the east, the Soviets and then
the Russians dumped radioactive waste
from the Russian Pacific Fleet into the Sea
of Japan until 1995, despite protests from
the Japanese government. The dumping
was halted when the Japanese government
agreed to sponsor a waste reprocessing
facility that is still under construction.
(Russia also reserves the right to resume
dumping in the future.)
The Pacific Fleet is generally consid-
ered an environmental disaster, although
the Russian Navy has been decommission-
ing many of its submarines, and the vol-
ume of waste is gradually being reduced.
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A nightmare in storage. Russia is struggling to find a
home for decades’ worth of nuclear waste. Liquid
radioactive waste was injected into the ground at
Tomsk-7 (left), where, despite warnings, local residents
still plant gardens in contaminated areas (below). More
than 32,000 spent fuel elements from naval vessels
such as nuclear-powered submarines (near right) are
stored in dilapidated facilities (far right, bottom) and
aboard the Lepse (far right, top), which sits moored
with its toxic cargo in the harbor at Murmansk.
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reactor exploded in a nuclear submarine at
Vladivostok, and some of the radioactive
contamination still remains at the bottom
of the bay. Two submarine landing plat-
forms nearby are full of liquid radioactive
waste—no one has been able to find a suit-
able way to dispose of it. As with the Kursk,
rust is eating away at unused submarines
still in the water, and environmentalist
observers fear that radioactive particles will
eventually leak out. 
In the late 1940s, the Soviets built a
major nuclear weapons test site near
Semipalatinsk, today a city of more than
300,000 in remote northeast Kazakhstan.
Until they were banned worldwide in
1962, atmospheric weapons tests were
often conducted at the site without warn-
ing, sending radioactive particles across the
region. Until 1989, hundreds of nuclear
bombs were tested in underground cav-
erns. Today, the region is ranked among
the most contaminated of the former
Soviet Union—many of its residents have
reportedly developed leukemia and other
blood disorders, babies have been born
with neurological and physical defects, and
some people have died of what appeared to
be radiation sickness. Precise data are
scarce, however; during the Soviet era,
medical workers were forced to conceal ill-
nesses that might have been caused by
exposure to radiation by either looking the
other way or recording a false diagnosis. In
1991, after declaring its independence,
Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk facili-
ty. In 1999 the last of 181 test tunnels
were sealed.
The Fergana Valley of Kyrgyzstan is
often called the “breadbasket of Central
Asia” because of the lush fields, pastures,
and orchards that feed millions of people in
the region. But residents there live with the
fear that their fertile valley could one day be
contaminated by an estimated 2.5 million
cubic yards (about 2 million cubic meters)
of radioactive waste from a nearby Soviet-
era uranium processing plant, according to
a 21 October 2000 article in The New York
Times. The material, much of it radioactive,
is buried under thin layers of unstable grav-
el, sand, and clay—ground that is at risk
for earthquakes, landslides, and floods. In
the event of such a disaster, rivers, streams,
and irrigation canals could transport the
material throughout a 60,000 square mile
region. Such fears are not without prece-
dent: in 1958, a reservoir wall collapsed,
and tons of radioactive material washed
down into the valley, while in 1992, a land-
slide blocked the river, causing the water to
back up and almost reach the waste sites
before it began flowing again. 
Focus on Cleanup
The most controversial cleanup proposal at
the moment—from Minatom—won pre-
liminary approval in January from the
Duma (Russian parliament) to allow the
importation and disposal of spent nuclear
fuel from abroad in exchange for payment.
Minatom is planning to turn the contami-
nated Mayak complex into an internation-
al nuclear waste dump. Importing spent
nuclear fuel is illegal under current Russian
law, but Minatom has successfully argued
that the generated revenue—the agency
predicts up to US$20 billion over the life
of the project—would go to help clean up
contaminated sites. The Duma is expected
to change the law in the near future to
allow the proposed cleanup strategy.
People from the Bellona Foundation
are skeptical that much of the projected
revenue would be used to restore contami-
nated sites. “Although Minatom claims
the revenue could reach $20 billion,” says
Nilsen, “at the same time they say that
$13 billion would go to infrastructure to
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nstore and transport the waste. So in the
best case only $7 billion would go to envi-
ronmental cleanup.”
Spent nuclear fuel includes the fuel
rods that are left over when uranium is
converted to plutonium. “The rods are
highly radioactive; if you stand next to one
unshielded, you’ll die in a few minutes,”
says Michael Mariotte, executive director
of the Nuclear Information and Resource
Service, based in Washington, D.C. He
says that after rods come out of a reactor,
they must be cooled in a pool of borated
water for at least several years. Borated
water contains boron, which helps moder-
ate the radioactivity in the fuel rods. The
rods also have to be kept apart; if they
touch each other, the fission process could
start up again. “Unfortunately,” says
Mariotte, “Russia doesn’t have a very good
track record in handling its own waste,
much less handling the waste of other
countries.”
“The money will be wasted,” says
Aleksandr Nikitin, director of the Bellona
Foundation’s office in St. Petersburg,
Russia. “It will stay within the [beltway]
around Moscow rather than be used as it
was intended. Russia lacks the technology
to manage nuclear wastes and spent nuclear
fuel. There are no technologies that can
manage this disposal in an environmentally
friendly manner.” He adds, “Mildly speak-
ing, the decision to import spent nuclear
fuel like this was a very unpopular decision.
The Duma do not understand the dangers
of this approach.”
On the other hand, Bunn says, if
appropriate arrangements are made for the
shipping and disposal of the fuel and the
use of revenue, then the danger to Russians
from the imported fuel would be very small
compared to that from the contamination
that would be fixed with the money gener-
ated. According to Bunn, one of the “dirty
little secrets” about nuclear fuel is that most
of it originates in the United States and is
sold to other countries, an arrangement
that through trade agreements gives the
U.S. government veto power over where
the fuel is sent and leverage to insist that
the money be used for nonproliferation and
cleanup and not wasted.
Mariotte adds that more than 150 envi-
ronmental groups sent letters to the U.S.
State and Energy Departments last
December urging the government to block
the entire Russian program by refusing to
allow waste of U.S. origin to be imported
into Russia. “Many of us are deeply skepti-
cal that U.S. insistence that the money be
spent on cleanup would actually mean the
money would be spent on cleanup,” says
Mariotte. “Minatom wants the program
because it wants funding to build new reac-
tors, not to clean up its existing messes.”
Western attempts to help remedy some
of the radioactive contamination problems
in the former Soviet Union have met with a
mixture of approval and concern. For exam-
ple, the European Commission recently
approved a $585 million loan to help
Ukraine build two new reactors that would
make up for the loss of nuclear-generated
electric power from Chornobyl. The
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development has offered to contribute
another $215 million. However, experts dis-
agree over whether the new reactors will be
much safer than the old ones. 
“Ukraine had started building these
reactors under the Soviet Union,” Mariotte
says, “and over the years they’ve been slow-
ly working on them as construction pro-
jects. In return for closing Chornobyl,
Ukraine insisted that the West compensate
them for the lost power by helping to com-
plete these reactors.” Mariotte says the
European Bank loan is the most controver-
sial that the group has ever approved; 32%
of its member banks rejected the proposal
or abstained from the vote. “They’re con-
cerned because the reactors are of old
Soviet design and still won’t meet Western
safety standards when they’re completed,”
he explains.
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Refueling Russia. Nuclear fuel reprocessing is a commercial activity in Russia. Spent fuel con-
taining plutonium is shipped from storage vessels (left) by train (above) to the Mayak reprocess-
ing plant. Today, Russian and Western scientists are collaborating on studies to document the
extent of the contamination in the Mayak area, which is perhaps the highest in the world.
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Refueling Russia. Nuclear fuel reprocessing is a commercial activity in Russia. Spent fuel con-
taining plutonium is shipped from storage vessels (left) by train (above) to the Mayak reprocess-
ing plant. Today, Russian and Western scientists are collaborating on studies to document the
extent of the contamination in the Mayak area, which is perhaps the highest in the world.
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upgrade Russian nuclear technology—have
also met with resistance. The German
Green Party protested when a German
company announced plans to sell plutoni-
um-processing equipment to Russia, argu-
ing that the country should not trade in
nuclear technology with the former Soviet
Union. Although the German government
supported the sale, contending that there
is a global interest in making weapons-
grade plutonium less dangerous through
better processing, the project has been put
on hold. 
In 1998, the United States began pro-
viding Russia with $30 million in assis-
tance to help bring commercial ventures
to Russia’s closed “nuclear cities.” The
Nuclear Cities Initiative was launched in
1998 to accelerate the consolidation of
Russia’s nuclear weapons complexes and
to create civilian jobs for displaced nuclear
weapons workers. To date, 30 civilian pro-
jects have been funded through the initia-
tive that will potentially employ more
than 700 people. The impetus for the ini-
tiative was the desire to attract Western
investment to the area; the hope is that
such improvements will keep Russia’s best
scientists from leaving to work for aspiring
nuclear powers such as Iran and Iraq, and
may also help discourage the theft of
nuclear weapons from the cities’ facilities.
Experts disagree on whether the Nuclear
Cities Initiative has led to positive change,
and according to Mariotte, the Bush
administration is planning to cut its fund-
ing as part of a general “lessening of coop-
eration” with Russia.
According to Bunn, the United States
has given Russia almost no money for
cleanup because of both an attitude that the
contamination is the Russians’ problem
and a lack of adequate funds to tackle such
hugely contaminated areas as Mayak. “The
Japanese and Norwegians have been
putting in more money, but it’s still small
potatoes compared to what is needed,” he
says. “Most of the U.S. money spent has
been for things felt to benefit our own secu-
rity, such as security systems and providing
jobs to scientists. . . . But we can kill two
birds with one stone by spending a small
amount of the cleanup research and devel-
opment money we’re spending anyway on
Russian scientists, who would work for less
and would develop solutions that both
Russia and the United States could use.”
In the meantime, Russian environmen-
tal groups such as Ecodefense and the St.
Petersburg branch of the Bellona Foun-
dation have been vigorously opposing what
they see as the Russian government’s fla-
grant disregard for the environmental
health effects of mounting radioactive con-
tamination throughout the country. For
example, Ecodefense has organized numer-
ous protests in the Mayak area to let peo-
ple know “what they are living next to,”
according to Slivyak.
“The present [political] climate in
Russia is not very warm toward this kind
of activity,” Slivyak says. “We want to
establish a strong, open, and democratic
society that would allow the public to have
control over its authorities and to keep
track of what they’re doing to solve these
problems. It’s important for all of us to be
working for the betterment of people who
are suffering from environmental disasters
in Russia.” 
Radioactive contamination disasters in
the former Soviet Union know no bound-
aries, as evidenced by the accident at
Chornobyl. Nuclear power plants,
weapons plants, and submarines in disre-
pair, coupled with disregard for the envi-
ronmental health consequences of poorly
implemented disposal programs, pose a
global threat. It remains to be seen how the
global community will respond to these
issues, but experts agree that the nuclear
threat remains a serious problem that will
not go away on its own.
Rebecca Clay
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The Whistle-Blowers
Aleksandr Nikitin was an average
Russian naval officer until his
retirement in 1992. Four years
later, however, he coauthored a
report, published by the Oslo-
based environmental group the
Bellona Foundation, claiming
that Russia’s nuclear submarines
were in a dangerous state of dis-
repair, a revelation that landed
him first in jail, then under house
arrest. The charge of espionage—having disclosed defense
secrets to a foreign power—made him the first political prisoner
since the official collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991.
Nikitin claims, however, that the information he gave to the
Bellona Foundation was already in the public domain; all he did
was help compile it.
“To solve the problem, you have to talk about the prob-
lem,” says Nikitin. “One of the most important points was to
start discussing the situation. If we hadn’t started revealing such
information, it’s quite possible that no one would have heard
anything about the Kursk when that happened. Back [during
the time of] the Soviet Union, when submarines sank no one
heard anything about it.”
After numerous trial appearances, Nikitin was acquitted of
the charges in December 1999 by the City Court of St.
Petersburg. Russian prosecutors
appealed the acquittal, but the Russian
Supreme Court Presidium upheld it,
making Nikitin the first person in history
to be acquitted on espionage charges in
Russia, according to Thomas Nilsen, a
researcher at the Bellona Foundation.
Nikitin is now head of Bellona’s office in
St. Petersburg.
In July 1999, after 20 months in
prison, Grigory Pasko was cleared of high
treason charges for revealing the Russian Navy’s practice of
dumping liquid radioactive nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan.
Pasko, who in addition to being a naval captain was an inves-
tigative journalist for Battle Watch, the official Pacific Fleet
newspaper, filmed the dumping in 1993 and gave the tape to
the Japanese television station NHK. Pasko was sentenced by a
military court in Vladivostok to three years in prison on a lesser
charge—abuse of his official position—but was freed presum-
ably in response to public pressure by international journalist
organizations and Amnesty International, which declared him a
prisoner of conscience. He is now attempting to clear his name,
according to a series of articles from July 1999 to the present in
the Vladivostok News. The Federal Security Service, successor to
the KGB, is now having him retried for treason. That trial began
on 22 March 2001. –Rebecca Clay
Focus •  Cold War, Hot Nukes
Pasko in detention Nikitin at the Supreme Court
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